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Justice Anthony Kennedy faces a simple choice with profound
consequences: When the Supreme Court considers the issue of marriage equality
for gays and lesbians, does he want to write the next Plessy v. Ferguson 1 or the
next Brown v. Board of Education?2
As Justice Kennedy approaches the issue, he likely knows it is just a matter
of time before gays and lesbians are accorded marriage equality in this country.
Since the year 2000, eleven countries have begun allowing same-sex couples to
marry: The Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, Canada, South Africa, Norway,
Sweden, Portugal, Iceland, Argentina, and Denmark.3 Last year, three more state
legislatures, in Maine, Maryland, and Washington, adopted legislation allowing
gays and lesbians to marry.4 Recent opinion polls show that half of Americans
now favor allowing gay marriage; 5 a 2011 poll found that 70% of Americans
between the ages 18 and 34 support gay marriage.6
In light of this, Justice Kennedy has to know that a Supreme Court opinion
rejecting marriage equality will be considered in hindsight to be as misguided as
the infamous Bowers v. Hardwick ruling, which held that states could
criminalize private, adult, consensual homosexual activity.7 Justice Kennedy
wrote the opinion in Lawrence v. Texas,8 overruling Bowers. In fact, Lawrence
v. Texas was one of only two Supreme Court decisions in history advancing
rights for gays and lesbians—the other was Romer v. Evans in 1996—and Justice
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1. 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding separate but equal as constitutional).
2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that separate can never be equal in public education).
3. The Freedom to Marry Internationally, F REEDOM TO MARRY, http://www.freedomto
marry.org/landscape/entry/c/international (last updated Dec. 2012).
4. States, FREEDOM TO MARRY, http://www.freedomtomarry.org/states (last updated Nov. 8,
2012).
5. Behind Gay Marriage Momentum, Regional Gaps Persist, PEW RES. CENTER FOR THE
PEOPLE & THE PRESS (Nov. 9, 2012), http://www.people-press.org/2012/11/09/behind-gaymarriage-momentum-regional-gaps-persist/; Frank Newport, Half of Americans Support Legal Gay
Marriage, GALLUP (May 8, 2012), http://www.gallup.com/poll/154529/Half-Americans-SupportLegal-Gay-Marriage.aspx.
6. Frank Newport, For First Time, Majority of Americans Favor Legal Gay Marriage,
GALLUP (May 20, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/147662/first-time-majority-americans-favorlegal-gay-marriage.aspx.
7. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding Georgia law prohibiting anal-genital or oral-genital
contacts).
8. 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (reversing Bowers and finding a constitutional right to engage in
private consensual same-sex sexual activity).
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Kennedy authored the majority opinions in both.9
The Supreme Court has granted review in two cases concerning marriage
equality to be decided in 2013. In United States v. Windsor, the Court will decide
the constitutionality of Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act, which states
that marriage must be between a man and a woman for the purposes of federal
law.10 In Hollingsworth v. Perry, the Court will decide the constitutionality of
California’s Proposition 8, which amended the California Constitution to provide
that marriage has to be between a man and a woman.11 Proposition 8 overturned
a California Supreme Court decision interpreting the California Constitution to
include a right to marriage equality for gays and lesbians.12 In each case, there
are jurisdictional questions: whether House Republicans can defend the Defense
of Marriage Act in light of the Obama administration’s refusal to do so, and
whether supporters of an initiative may defend it on appeal when the Governor
and Attorney General refuse to do so.
In Perry, the Supreme Court has the opportunity to decide the
constitutionality of same-sex marriage.13 In doing so, Justice Kennedy and the
Court can choose between two possible approaches in invalidating Proposition
8.14
I.
RULE NARROWLY AND INVALIDATE ONLY CALIFORNIA’S PROPOSITION 8
One approach for Justice Kennedy would be to rule narrowly in
Hollingsworth v. Perry, as the Ninth Circuit did in Perry v. Brown, and simply
strike down California’s Proposition 8.15 This approach has the virtue of
9. Id.; Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (invalidating a Colorado initiative repealing all
laws in the state protecting gays and lesbians from discrimination and prohibiting the enactment of
any new such statutes).
10. United States v. Windsor, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 81 U.S.L.W.
3116 (U.S. Dec. 7, 2012) (No. 12-307) (citing Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. § 7 (1996)).
11. 81 U.S.L.W. 3075 (U.S. Dec. 7, 2012) (No. 12-144), granting cert. to Perry v. Brown,
671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), aff'g Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal.
2010); Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d at 1067 (citing CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, OFFICIAL VOTER
INFORMATION GUIDE 54 (2008), available at http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2008/general/titlesum/pdf/prop8-title-summary.pdf).
12. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d at 1063.
13. I focus primarily on Perry in this Comment, rather than Windsor, because I am
contributing to a larger dialogue that began in the Symposium sponsored by the N.Y.U. Review of
Law & Social Change, “Making Constitutional Change: The Past, Present, and Future Role of
Perry v. Brown.” This Comment expands upon the points I made regarding Perry as a Symposium
panelist.
14. There is a third approach available that would have the effect of invalidating Proposition
8: the Court could say that supporters of Proposition 8 lack standing to appeal Judge Walker’s
ruling striking down the initiative. This would leave Judge Walker’s state-wide injunction in place.
I do not focus on this alternative in this essay, choosing instead to examine how the Supreme Court
should write an opinion striking down Proposition 8 on the merits.
15. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d at 1080–82 (9th Cir. 2012).
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invalidating only the California initiative without affecting other states that have
always prohibited same-sex marriage. It may appeal to Justice Kennedy as a way
of proceeding one step at a time.
This approach is also founded on sound constitutional grounds. Prior to the
enactment of Proposition 8 in November 2008, California allowed both oppositesex and same-sex couples to marry.16 Proposition 8 took this right away from
gays and lesbians only.17 In its 2-1 decision in Perry v. Brown, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that there is simply no legitimate reason for depriving only gays and
lesbians of the right to marry.18 The court relied heavily on the Supreme Court’s
decision in Romer v. Evans, which declared unconstitutional a Colorado
initiative that repealed laws protecting gays and lesbians from discrimination.19
Yet there is something unsatisfying about the Supreme Court taking this
approach. Just as there is no legitimate reason for California to take away the
right to marry only from gays and lesbians, there is no legitimate reason for other
states to deny them this right. In Lawrence v. Texas and Romer v. Evans, Justice
Kennedy, writing for the Court, found laws burdening gays and lesbians
unconstitutional because they lacked any legitimate government purpose.20 The
same is true for all laws prohibiting marriage equality for gays and lesbians.
Also, the Ninth Circuit’s approach brings to light a difficult underlying issue: if a
state recognizes a right that is not required by the Constitution, when may it
repeal that right?
II.
RULE BROADLY AND INVALIDATE ALL BANS ON MARRIAGE EQUALITY AS
VIOLATIONS OF EQUAL PROTECTION
This leads to the second approach, the one I believe Kennedy and the Court
should take: follow the lead of Judge Vaughn Walker in the Northern District of
California and declare that laws denying marriage equality to gays and lesbians
violate equal protection.21 Justice Kennedy can write an opinion in Perry that is
very similar to those he authored in Romer and Lawrence, stating that there is no
legitimate government interest in denying marriage equality to gays and lesbians.
Justice Kennedy can go through each justification offered for denying
16. Id. at 1076.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1095 (“Proposition 8 operates with no apparent purpose but to impose on gays and
lesbians, through the public law, a majority’s private disapproval of them and their relationships . .
. . Proposition 8 therefore violates the Equal Protection Clause.”).
19. Id. at 1080–82 (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 627 (1996)) (comparing Proposition
8 to the amendment at issue in Romer).
20. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003); Romer, 517 U.S. at 621.
21. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1003 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d sub nom.
Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), granting cert. sub nom. to Hollingsworth v. Perry,
81 U.S.L.W. 3075 (U.S. Dec. 7, 2012) (No. 12-144).
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marriage equality and find that none is a legitimate government interest. For
instance, one argument against same-sex marriage is that marriage is inherently
between opposite-sex spouses. But that is a definition, not an argument. The fact
that marriage has traditionally been between opposite-sex spouses doesn’t reveal
anything about the characteristics of marriage and why those characteristics have
to be limited to opposite-sex couples. Under this form of argument, laws that
prohibited interracial marriage were also constitutional. The Virginia law that
prohibited interracial marriage existed for almost three hundred years.22 If a long
tradition of prohibiting particular types of marriage is sufficient, then the Court
came to the wrong conclusion in Loving v. Virginia.23
Certainly, the existence of a practice over a long period of time doesn’t tell
us anything about whether that practice is legitimate or permissible. Admittedly,
Loving used strict scrutiny, and it is uncertain whether the Supreme Court would
do so in examining the ban on marriage equality for gays and lesbians, under
either the Due Process or Equal Protection clauses.24 But if one thinks about all
of the core characteristics of marriage—the expression of love and commitment,
the benefits and responsibilities—none of these has anything to do with the
sexual orientation of the individuals participating.
A second argument that is likely to be advanced in the Court is that marriage
is inherently about procreation.25 Same-sex marriage doesn’t make sense, it is
argued, because same-sex couples can’t procreate without assistance.26 This
argument is wrong on every possible level. Marriage, of course, is not inherently
about procreation. Couples are allowed to get marriage licenses even if one or
both of the spouses can’t or don’t want to procreate. Women past the age of
menopause can get marriage licenses, as can men who have been sterilized or are
infertile. A requirement of intent to procreate does not exist for heterosexual
couples that want a marriage license, so there’s no sense imposing one on samesex couples. More importantly, same-sex couples do procreate, whether through
artificial insemination, surrogacy, or adoption. Even if marriage were about
procreation, there would be no legitimate reason to deny it to same-sex couples
because they have children, too.
A third argument is that children do better with opposite-sex parents than
with same-sex parents, and thus the government is justified in denying marriage
licenses for same-sex couples. President George W. Bush made this argument.
He said the social science data shows that children do better if they have parents

22. RACHEL F. MORAN, INTERRACIAL INTIMACY: THE REGULATION OF RACE AND ROMANCE 19
(2001).
23. 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (finding bans on interracial marriage unconstitutional).
24. Id. at 11.
25. This was the primary argument of the supporters of Proposition 8 in the Ninth Circuit.
See Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d at 1086–87 (9th Cir. 2012).
26. Id.
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of opposite genders.27
At the outset, it is important to note that studies do not actually support that
proposition. The studies that George Bush pointed to show that children with
single parents often have more problems than children with two parents.28 But
that has nothing do to with sexual orientation. It does reflect that being a parent
is enormously difficult. (As somebody who has always been fortunate enough to
have a partner in parenting, I can only imagine how difficult it is to be a single
parent of a child.) It doesn’t at all relate to the issue of whether or not same-sex
couples should get marriage licenses.
Most of all, the problem with this argument is that it truly misses the point.
The question is not whether same-sex couples should have children or not. The
reality is that same-sex couples are going to have children. The question
becomes whether children of same-sex couples are better off if their parents are
married. I know of no studies that compare children with same-sex parents who
are married to children with same-sex parents who are unmarried. Same-sex
marriage is so new, not only in the United States but around the world, that time
is needed to do such studies. Yet everything that we understand about marriage
and how it contributes to the stability of relationships indicates that children with
same-sex parents are better off if their parents are married, because marriage is
more likely to lead to stable relationships.
In explaining this, Justice Kennedy can echo the words of Chief Judge
Judith Kaye of the New York Court of Appeals, who declared:
The State plainly has a legitimate interest in the welfare of
children, but excluding same-sex couples from marriage in no
way furthers this interest. In fact, it undermines it. Civil
marriage provides tangible legal protections and economic
benefits to married couples and their children, and tens of
thousands of children are currently being raised by same-sex
couples in New York. . . . The State’s interest in a stable society
is rationally advanced when families are established and remain
intact irrespective of the gender of the spouses.29
A fourth argument that is often made against same-sex marriage is that it
will harm the institution of marriage. I confess that I don’t understand this
argument. No heterosexual couple’s marriage is adversely affected in the
slightest by virtue of gays and lesbians also being able to marry. In fact, I cannot
think of anything more affirming of the institution of marriage in my lifetime
than the fight by gays and lesbians to be able to marry.
Thus, I believe that Justice Kennedy and the Court should choose the second
27. Benedict Carey, Experts Dispute Bush on Gay-Adoption Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2005,
at A16.
28. Id.
29. Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 32 (N.Y. 2006) (Kaye, C.J., dissenting).
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path: decide that laws prohibiting marriage equality for gays and lesbians violate
equal protection because they lack a legitimate government purpose.
For many years, Justice Kennedy taught constitutional law at McGeorge
Law School in Sacramento.30 As he imagines professors teaching the law in this
area, it is hard to think that he would want to be remembered as the author of a
Plessy v. Ferguson31 or a Bowers v. Hardwick.32 My hope is that Justice
Kennedy will realize that the Perry decision, together with his opinions in Romer
v. Evans and Lawrence v. Texas, can define his legacy as the justice in American
history who did the most to advance equality based on sexual orientation. The
alternative—an opinion reversing the Ninth Circuit—is on the wrong side of
history, and it would ultimately be regarded as seriously misguided.
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Anthony_Kennedy.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2013).
31. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
32. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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